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In Taiwan, a temperature-monitoring campaign and
hotline for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) fever
were implemented in June 2003. Among 1,966 calls, fever
was recorded in 19% (n = 378); 18 persons at high risk for
SARS were identified. In a cross-sectional telephone sur-
vey, 95% (n = 1,060) of households knew about the cam-
paign and 7 households reported fever.
F
ever is one of the first signs of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) (1–3). Persons with fevers initially
attributed to other illnesses have caused outbreaks of
SARS in hospitals and the community (1–7). This finding
highlights the need for early recognition of cases.
On June 1, 2003, in Taiwan, a National Temperature
Monitoring Campaign and SARS fever hotline were
launched. These were intended to raise public awareness
about SARS (and fever as an early sign of SARS), improve
early detection of possible SARS cases, and prevent SARS
transmission. In the campaign, fever was defined as fore-
head or axillary temperature >37°C, oral temperature
>37.5°C, or tympanic or rectal temperature >38°C (8).2
In conjunction with this campaign, persons with fevers
were encouraged to call a toll-free SARS fever hotline. The
hotline objectives were to appropriately triage persons with
fever, reduce clinic visits by the “worried well,” identify
persons at high risk for SARS, reduce opportunities for
SARS exposure, and increase the public’s sense of security.
Both the body-temperature monitoring campaign and
the hotline were publicized through television, posters,
fliers, radio, the Internet, magazines, and newspapers. We
describe and evaluate the body-temperature monitoring
campaign and the SARS fever hotline.
Methods
Our investigation evaluated the community-wide body-
temperature monitoring campaign and SARS fever hotline
in the city of Taipei, which makes up 11.8% of the popula-
tion of Taiwan (population of Taiwan, 22.51 million [9]).
We analyzed data from three sources: hotline call data
reported to the Bureau of National Health Insurance for all
of Taiwan; hotline call data for Taipei; and data from a
telephone survey of Taipei residents. Data were evaluated
for the period June 1–10, 2003, corresponding to the dura-
tion of the body-temperature monitoring campaign as well
as the first 10 days of the hotline.2
SARS Fever Hotline Data
Throughout Taiwan, each local medical association
responsible for operating the fever hotline in its city or
county provided daily reports to the Bureau of National
Health Insurance. The total number of calls and the advice
given to the caller were reported. Because operation of the
hotline varied by locality, further analysis was limited to
Taipei city, where the Taipei Medical Association staffed
the hotline and 52 physicians worked 6-hour shifts
between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. daily. Physicians were
provided with an algorithm (Figure 1) for triaging callers
and evaluating SARS risk level. Persons at high risk for
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tory of quarantine, travel to SARS-affected areas, or con-
tact with SARS cases. Physicians also received a form to
document all calls. Data fields on the form were caller or
patient name, sex, district of residence, telephone number,
a section for comments, a checklist of topics discussed,
and diagnosis. The diagnosis field was narrative; therefore,
data were classified into broad categories based on the
body part or system affected. The hotline data collection
forms did not include anatomic site of temperature meas-
urement, therefore, for our evaluation, fever was defined
as a recorded body temperature of >38°C.2
Cross-Sectional Telephone Survey of Taipei Residents
A telephone survey of Taipei city residents was per-
formed to assess knowledge of the body-temperature mon-
itoring campaign and use of the fever hotline. Households
in Taipei were selected for participation in the survey on
June 13 to 14, 2003, using a simple random sample of
home telephone numbers. Interviewers explained the sur-
vey to potential respondents and obtained verbal consent
before administering a brief questionnaire. 
The Yates corrected chi-square test and the Fisher exact
test were used for comparison of groups.
Results
Taiwan SARS Fever Hotline Data
During June 1 to 10, a total of 11,228 calls were made
to Taiwan’s population-wide fever hotline (Figure 2).
Persons were advised to seek further medical evaluation
(through family physician, fever clinic, or by ambulance)
in 28% (n = 3,100) of calls, and persons were advised to
remain at their residence and monitor symptoms in 21% (n
= 2,385) of calls. Neither of these recommendations was
given in 51% (n = 5,743) of calls. 
Taipei SARS Fever Hotline Data
During June 1 to 10, a total of 1,966 calls were made to
the fever hotline in Taipei. Body temperature was recorded
for 51% (n = 1,012) of calls. Atemperature of >38°C (range
34.0°C–41.0°C, median 37.6°C) was recorded in 37%
(n = 378) of calls in which body temperature was recorded.
Of the 453 calls with diagnoses, the most common were
respiratory and gastrointestinal syndromes (Table 1) for
persons with or without fevers. Among calls for which the
recommendation given was documented, callers with fever
were more likely than callers without fever to be advised to
see a physician for further medical evaluation (p < 0.001)
or go to a fever clinic (p < 0.001) (Table 2).
Eighteen (0.9%) persons were identified as being at
high risk for SARS. Of these, 5 (28%) had fever, 2 (11%)
had no fever, and temperature was unrecorded for 11
(61%). One person with unrecorded temperature was
advised to stay home and monitor symptoms, and one per-
son with a fever was advised to visit a physician. The
advice given to the remaining 16 persons was not recorded.
Cross-Sectional Telephone Survey of Taipei Residents
Of the 4,000 telephone numbers dialed, 2,999 numbers
were invalid, unanswered, or refusals. Of the 1,111 survey
participants, 58% (n = 643) were female, the median age
was 47 years (range 20–91), and the median number of
people per household was 4 (range 1–17). Ninety-five
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Figure 1. Triage algorithm for febrile patients, severe acute respi-
ratory  syndrome fever hotline, Taipei, June 2003.
Figure 2. Advice given to callers to severe acute respiratory syn-
drome fever hotline, Taiwan, June 2003. percent (n = 1,060) and 71% (n = 791) of respondents had
heard about the body-temperature monitoring campaign
and the fever hotline, respectively. The most common
sources of information about the campaign were television
(86%), newspapers or magazines (36%), and neighbor-
hood leaders (26%). Twice-daily temperature monitoring
of at least one household member was reported by 95% (n
= 1,012) of persons who knew of the campaign and 76% of
the 51 who were unaware of the campaign (n = 39). 
Seven (0.63%) respondents reported a fever in their
household during June 1 to 10, 2003. Although five (71%)
of these fevers occurred in households in which the
respondent knew about the hotline, in only one case was
the fever hotline used; actions of the remaining six are
unknown. The person who called the hotline reported that
the advice given by the physician was to stay home and
monitor the symptoms and that the advice was followed.
Among all respondents, 24% (n = 267) said that they
would call the fever hotline for advice, 54% (n = 605)
would go to a hospital, 19% (n = 207) would visit an out-
patient clinic, and 1% (n = 10) would do nothing and wait
to see if the fever disappeared. The remaining respondents
refused or said they would do something else.
Discussion
The population-wide body-temperature monitoring
campaign and fever hotline were innovative interventions
aimed at raising public awareness about SARS, improving
early detection of fever, and providing appropriate medical
triage. Developed as an emergent response to the SARS
outbreak in Taiwan, these interventions were rapidly
implemented, leaving little time available to develop hot-
line data-collection instruments, train hotline staff, or
prospectively plan for intervention evaluation. Despite
these challenges, the interventions were evaluated by using
available data, and a rapidly implemented population-
based survey of Taipei city residents. 
Approximately 50% of calls to the population-wide
fever hotline did not result in referrals for further evalua-
tion of fever, suggesting they were complaints unrelated
to fever. In Taipei, 37% of respondents with body temper-
ature recorded had fevers, a low proportion for a hotline
intended for persons with fever. The low proportion of
febrile persons is likely partly due to the definition of
fever used in this evaluation. These results might also be
partially due to worried-well callers. To improve appro-
priate use of a dedicated SARS fever hotline, media mes-
sages should be refined and the use of alternative
resources for answering more general questions about
SARS should be encouraged. During the outbreak, the
Center for Disease Control of Taiwan established a public
information line about SARS. If a fever hotline is used in
future outbreaks, callers could be referred to the public
information line with questions about temperature meas-
urement, travel concerns, and other issues not directly
related to a current febrile illness. The dedicated hotline
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Table 1. Diagnoses reported for callers by recorded body temperature, Taipei SARS fever hotline, June 1–10, 2003 (n = 1,966)
a 
  Body temperature 
Diagnosis or syndrome  Fever >38°C  (%)  No fever  (%)  Unknown/unrecorded 
Possible SARS  5 (1.3)  2 (0.3)  11 (1.2) 
Respiratory  65 (17.2)  99 (15.6)  40 (4.2) 
Dermatologic  0 (0)  1 (0.2)  3 (0.3) 
Head-related
b  6 (1.6)  10 (1.6)  2 (0.2) 
Gastrointestinal  21 (5.6)  47 (7.4)  14 (1.5) 
Genitourinary  7 (1.9)  8 (1.3)  4 (0.4) 
Other  27 (7.1)  31 (4.9)  50 (5.2) 
Unknown/missing  247 (65.3)  436 (68.8)  830 (87.0) 
Total  378  634  954 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bIncludes neurologic. 
Table 2. Reported advice given to persons by recorded body temperatures, Taipei SARS fever hotline, June 1–10, 2003 (n = 1,966)
a 
Body temperature 
Advice given  Fever >38°C  (%)  No fever  (%)  Unknown/unrecorded  (%) 
Stay home and monitor
b  19 (5.0)  42 (6.6)  21 (2.2) 
See physician
b  116 (30.7)  55 (8.7)  40 (4.2) 
Go to fever clinic  21 (5.6)  2 (0.3)  5 (0.5) 
Call ambulance  1 (0.3)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Unknown or unrecorded
b  221 (58.5)  535 (84.4)  888 (93.1) 
Total  378  634  954 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bAdvice given to 18 callers at high risk for SARS: for 5 with fever: see physician (1 caller); unknown or unrecorded (4 callers). For 2 callers with no fever: unknown or 
unrecorded (2 callers). For 11 callers with unknown body temperature: stay home and monitor (1 caller); unknown or unrecorded (10 callers).   could then focus on addressing its stated objectives more
efficiently.
In the population-based survey, almost all respondents
knew about the body-temperature monitoring campaign,
and 71% knew about the fever hotline. The Bureau of
National Health Insurance was highly successful in publi-
cizing the campaign and hotline and should consider using
similar methods for future hotlines. 
An important aspect of this evaluation is assessing the
potential impact of these interventions on improving early
SARS detection. Eighteen callers to the fever hotline were
identified as being at high risk for SARS. Because these
persons were not followed up for outcome, determining if
any subsequently met the World Health Organization’s
suspected or probable SARS case definition was not possi-
ble. Furthermore, because hotline data were not always
collected systematically, determining if all callers at high
risk for SARS were identified was difficult. Lastly, sparse
risk factor data limit our ability to determine if more per-
sons at high risk for SARS should have been identified.
Taking these limitations into account, the hotline potential-
ly identified an estimated cohort of persons at high risk for
SARS equivalent to 9.5% of the 190 suspected and proba-
ble SARS cases reported in Taiwan in the same 10-day
period.
Documentation of the advice and referrals given by
physicians was missing for a substantial proportion of
calls; therefore, judging whether these callers were appro-
priately referred is not possible. The reasons for missing
data are not yet fully elucidated. A telephone survey of
callers to the Taipei SARS fever hotline is in progress to
assess advice and referrals given and caller compliance.
An algorithm and accompanying questionnaire that
includes clearly articulated steps to measure temperature
and document risk factors might assist in standardizing
risk assessment, advice, referrals, and evaluation in future
outbreaks.2
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